The European Union’s energy security

Corina Cristea, 09.10.2026, 13:30

Europe is preparing for winter in a complex energy landscape: the war in Ukraine, launched by Moscow nearly 5 years ago and having radically altered Europe’s energy architecture, continues to strain relations with Russia, while the conflict in the Middle East has introduced a new vulnerability regarding seaborne liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments.

Before the war, Russia was the EU’s primary foreign gas supplier, and the European economy had long relied on pipeline gas imports. Since February 2022, this relationship has worsened; Brussels responded by stepping up the diversification of its supply sources, ramped up LNG imports, and invested in infrastructure to enable gas deliveries from the US, Norway, Qatar, North Africa, and Azerbaijan.

Has Europe achieved energy independence, or has it merely swapped one major dependence for other foreign vulnerabilities? Professor Claudiu Degeratu, a military security expert, explains:

 “Diversification has been the watchword since the start of the war in Ukraine, and naturally, reducing reliance on the Russian Federation was the second priority, though, in my view, one that has been implemented with difficulty and at a slow pace. A third key aspect is the equally challenging task of bolstering internal European capacities for additional energy production. Looking at Germany alone, the country has been grappling for years with two issues: reducing reliance on Nord Stream 2 and the ill-fated decision to phase out nuclear power plants. Therefore, we are not in an ideal position: while the long-term direction, moving away from dependence on the Russian Federation’s highly manipulative energy policies regarding the EU markets, is sound, we must simultaneously navigate a difficult period of adjustment.”

The current landscape reveals that while Europe has reduced one strategic dependence, the one on Russia, it has become far more exposed to the global energy market, where two wars can alter supply routes and prices almost overnight. The immediate challenge lies in replenishing reserves ahead of the cold season. By the end of August, European Union gas storage facilities were approximately 63% full, well below the average of around 80% reported during that period in recent years, and data from Gas Infrastructure Europe showed EU storage levels at roughly 72% on October 3.

This level does not mean Europe is running out of natural gas. However, it is relatively low for this time of year, leaving less room for manoeuvre in the event of a harsh winter or a fresh supply disruption, even though the European Union now has more liquefied natural gas terminals, interconnections, and alternative supply sources than it did during the 2022 energy crisis.

With 2 wars putting pressure on its energy security from different directions, analysts say the European Union’s current challenge is not whether it will have enough natural gas to heat homes, but rather at what price and under what geopolitical conditions it can secure that supply. Once again, the military security expert Claudiu Degeratu:

 “I believe that, fundamentally, the European Union has the capacity to accelerate preparations for winter, but we must harbour no illusions: we will not have cheap energy. When we look at market trends and the uncertainty surrounding these vital strategic routes, we realise that we will, in fact, have to pay a higher price for energy. We need to prepare psychologically, economically, and politically to face this issue. It is no easy task to undergo an energy transition within a European market that has relied on cheap Russian gas for years, over two or even three decades. The economic model is clearly shifting, and the EU mechanisms must adapt as well. We must be prepared to shoulder the costs of an energy transition, which is a complex undertaking. As you can see, switching to renewable energy on the scale we desire, that is, abundant and affordable, is not simple; there must be a balance.”

The conflict in the Middle East has proved how quickly a geopolitical shock can impact European consumers. The closure or disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical energy routes, has severely affected liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows from the region, reducing availability. For the European Union, this translates into a twofold problem: less available liquefied gas means fiercer competition with Asia for every shipment, while prices rise rapidly when buyers fear that future supplies might be insufficient. So Europe is not primarily facing a physical natural gas crisis, but rather the risk of a price and competitiveness crisis. And the strategic lesson for Europe might be that true energy security does not mean swapping one supplier for another, but rather building a system in which no single supplier, route, or technology can become indispensable. (AMP)